Αποστροφή προκαλεί η αποκάλυψη ότι η Αμερική πίεσε τη Δανία
να «φιμώσει» την αγωνιώδη φωνή του κουρδικού λαού, ο οποίος αγωνίζεται
για την επιβίωσή του, προκειμένου να ικανοποιήσει την πάντα πρόθυμη να
υπακούσει τις σκοτεινές εντολές της Τουρκία.
Ειδικότερα, το 2009, η Δανία φέρεται να συμφώνησε να ξεκινήσει
νομική δράση για το κλείσιμο του Roj TV, του κουρδικού καναλιού που
εξέπεμπε από την Κοπεγχάγη, προκειμένου να κατευνάσει την Τουρκία.Σε
αντάλλαγμα, η Άγκυρα συμφώνησε να στηρίξει τον Rasmussen ως επικεφαλής
του ΝΑΤΟ.
Οι μυστικές αυτές συμφωνίες αποκαλύπτονται στα απόρρητα
τηλεγραφήματα των αμερικανικών πρεσβειών στην Κοπεγχάγη και την Άγκυρα
που διέρρευσαν μέσω της Wikileaks.Οι Αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες φέρεται να
έχουν συνεχή επικοινωνία με τις δύο πλευρές, πιέζοντας μάλιστα τη Δανία
να επιταχύνει τις διαδικασίες.
Στις εγκλίσεις τους, η Δανία διαμαρτύρονταν επανειλημμένα ότι η
Τουρκία δεν της παρέχει το απαραίτητο υλικό για να συνεχίσει τη νομική
διαδικασία και επέρριπτε την ευθύνη στους Τούρκους που δεν κατανοούν
πλήρως το νομικό σύστημα της Δανίας.
Ωστόσο, όλα έγιναν όπως συμφωνήθηκαν. Ο Ράσμουσεν εξελέγη γγ του
ΝΑΤΟ το 2009 με τη σύμφωνη γνώμη της Τουρκίας και το 2013 το κουρδικό
κανάλι έχασε οριστικά την άδεια εκπομπής, με την κατηγορία της προώθησης
της τρομοκρατίας.
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O’Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary. Turkey’s March 9 response to a long-standing
Danish request for concrete, «actionable» information on the
link between PKK and ROJ-TV was inadequate, Danish Ambassador
Vahr complained to us March 11. Turkey has not yet responded
to Denmark’s December proposal of formal bilateral
counterterrorism (CT) «action plan.» Vahr wonders whether
Ankara’s slowness in responding to Danish requests could be
intentional, to keep Denmark as a convenient whipping boy,
and fears closure of the current window of opportunity to
engage high-level Danish law enforcement officials. We agree
that another roundtable bringing Turkish and Danish legal
experts together to examine actual cases could help bridge
the communication gap. End summary.
ROJ-TV: The Thorn in the Side
—————————–
2. (C) Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr described to us March 11
recent Danish counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Turkey,
including Danish efforts to address the ROJ-TV issue. Turkey
asserts ROJ-TV is affiliated with and supports the PKK (KGK),
but it has not been able to provide Danish authorities with
concrete evidence of the tie between the two that would hold
up in a court of law, Vahr stated. Denmark’s inability to
find legal mechanisms to shut-down Kurdish-language
broadcasts from Denmark by ROJ-TV remains the major issue in
the bilateral relationship and the one which occupies more of
his time than any other, Vahr stated.
3. (C) Six months after Denmark’s formal request for more
concrete information to support Turkey’s allegations that
ROJ-TV is linked to the PKK (and over 10 months after its
initial informal request), Turkey’s Ministry of Justice on
March 9 finally provided an 11-page document purporting to
document the connection. Clearly frustrated, Vahr complained
the Turks response was still inadequate; the information
provided would not hold up in a court of law. Despite
several sessions between Turkish and Danish experts, Turkey
still does not seem to «get it.» Turkey continues to focus
primarily on ROJ-TV messages, whereas Denmark had explained
it needs to be able to demonstrate that ROJ-TV is either
laundering money that ends up at foundations clearly
affiliated with the PKK or that it has an institutional link
with the terrorist group. Vahr hoped for an opportunity for
Turkish and European legal experts to go over actual cases,
as suggested at the June 2008 roundtable for Turkish and
European prosecutors (Ref a).
4. (S) Vahr reviewed Danish efforts to demonstrate its
good-faith to strengthen bilateral CT cooperation. These
included Danish assistance in investigating a 2006 bombing on
Turkey’s southern coast with links to Denmark; provision of
passenger name lists for Copenhagen-Erbil flights involving
Kurdish cash couriers; September 2007 VIP security detail
training of Turkish National Police; an April 2008 visit to
Turkey by Danish State Prosecutors Office and Copenhagen
police officials directly involved with the ROJ-TV case;
January 2009 assistance to Turkey’s new witness protection
system; and ongoing cooperation on al Qaeda plots in Denmark
with links to Turkey. Noting that Turkey is in the midst of
restructuring its CT mechanisms, Vahr said he had recently
offered Interior Minister Atalay to share Denmark’s
experience establishing a counterterrorism analysis center
two years ago. The Minister was very interested, Vahr
reported.
5. (C) Denmark had also become more forthcoming on formal CT
cooperation, Amb. Vahr stated. When Turkey first proposed a
bilateral CT agreement in December 2007, during inaugural CT
consultations, Denmark was reluctant to sign a «stand alone»
agreement, proposing an MOU instead (Ref b). In December
2008, however, Denmark presented a draft bilateral CT «Action
Plan.» MFA Undersecretary Tezcan would be the likely
negotiator on the Turkish side, Vahr opined. To Vahr’s
frustration, however, Ankara has not yet responded to the
Danish proposal.
Political Games?
—————-
6. (C) Vahr speculated aloud whether Turkey’s slowness in
responding to Denmark’s requests, and the thinness of the
material provided, might be part of a deliberate effort to
drag out the ROJ-TV matter, thus retaining Denmark as a
«whipping boy» to be produced and criticized when politically
expedient. As an example, he pointed to a critical letter
sent by PM Erdogan to Danish PM Rasmussen following the
October 2008 PKK attack on a Turkish military outpost in
which 15 soldiers were reported killed. He also wondered how
the ROJ-TV issue would affect Turkey’s attitude toward the
NATO Secretary General candidacy of Danish PM Rasmussen.
Vahr was anxious to persuade the Turks to move more quickly
and to maintain the momentum in CT relations begun with the
December 2007 CT consultations and bolstered by the April
2008 Chief Prosecutor’s visit. MFA U/S Apakan had visited
Copenhagen February 24 and of course raised ROJ-TV. Now,
Vahr stressed, the two sides had a window of opportunity,
with high-level Danish interest among law enforcement
authorities. He feared Danish interest would wane if Turkey
is not more forthcoming with concrete information. Denmark
has pressing competing priorities, including a growing
domestic gang war. He understood that Turkey had been able
to provide the UK with the information needed to close
PKK-affiliated MED-TV in London in 1999 and did not
understand why they could not do the same for ROJ-TV.
Comment
——-
7. (C) ROJ-TV continues to dominate Denmark-Turkey
relations. While we understand Danish frustration, Turkey’s
«thin» responses may be a matter of inadequate understanding
of Danish legal requirements rather than of deliberately
dragging the issue out. We agree that providing Turkish and
European prosecutors and other legal experts the opportunity
to go over actual cases could prove to be a valuable
mechanism for bridging the gaps in understanding. S/CT PDAS
Schlicher’s upcoming visit to Ankara, Copenhagen and other
European capitals could also help facilitate closer
cooperation against the PKK and other terrorist groups.
Jeffrey
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Terence McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) In recent discussions, Danish government officials and the
chief prosecutor in the case against PKK-affiliated Roj-TV underscored
their determination to address that case according to Danish law,
expressing frustration with the evidence produced so far and unwilling
to predict when the station may be taken to court. Danish pledges to
intensify efforts against Roj-TV — among the measures offered Turkey for
not blocking former PM Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO secretary
general — have given additional impetus to the investigation while also
prompting senior officials to tread carefully, to avoid the appearance
of a quid pro quo (i.e., sacrificing freedom of speech in exchange for a
high-level post). The Danes report, however, that they are pursuing
«new angles» to the case and would welcome the opportunity to discuss
them in greater detail with the anticipated U.S. counterterrorism
delegation (among these «new angles» may be information developed
through an informant and alternative approaches on broadcasting content
and tax evasion). Denmark: No Interference with Judicial Process
——————————————— -
2. (S) Shortly after the NATO Strasbourg Summit at which Rasmussen
secured his new post over Turkish objections, PM National Security
Advisor Thomas Ahrenkiel emphasized to us the importance of resolving
the Roj-TV issue through legal and intelligence channels. Ahrenkiel, who
has stayed on as NSA to the new prime minister, signaled that his
office wanted to avoid any suggestion of undue political pressure in the
matter, and encouraged us to work directly with the chief prosecutor,
Lise-Lotte Nilas. When pressed a few weeks later by visiting U.S.
Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker (reftel), Ahrenkiel acknowledged that he
had not been keeping his Turkish counterpart informed about the case,
but (reluctantly, it seemed) agreed to do so in light of growing Turkish
concerns. The PM’s office and the MFA remain wary of raising their
profile on Roj-TV, concerned about the domestic political fallout and
potential damage to the case itself. Stymied on Content, Still Looking
for PKK Links ——————————————— –
3. (C) Prosecutor Nilas and Danish Security and Intelligence
Service (PET) Legal Advisor Lykke Sorensen reviewed for us the status of
the Roj-TV investigation May 20, highlighting the case’s long history
and ongoing challenges. The initial focus, they recalled, had been to
investigate Turkish complaints based on Roj-TV’s broadcasting content.
Twice the Danish Radio and Television Board has ruled on the matter,
concluding — after reviewing television footage provided by Turkish
authorities — that Roj-TV’s programming did not incite hatred, violence
or otherwise corrupt minors, as alleged by Turkey. Rather, the Danish
board ruled, most recently in May 2007, that Roj-TV’s broadcasts
resemble those of other news organizations covering violence and
terrorist acts. Sorensen noted that, otherwise, sanctions could be
similarly applied to any news outlet that covered, for example,
terrorist bombings in Iraq or news of the latest al-Qaeda statement.
Nilas noted that the recent German court decision suspending the ban on
Roj-TV there made it that much more difficult to argue against the
station on content.
4. (S) Denmark’s criminal investigation of Roj-TV has focused,
meanwhile, on establishing institutional links between the station and
the PKK, especially on the financial side. Despite the Danish police’s
and tax authorities” own efforts, intelligence provided by the Turks and
us, interdictions of suspected couriers and stepped-up cooperation with
EU partners (Nilas mentioned the Belgians, Germans and French through
EUROJUST), no clear evidence has been found to connect the broadcaster
with the PKK. Roj-TV has learned to be very careful over the years,
evincing an open and cooperative attitude toward occasional — and
fruitless — reviews of their books. Sorensen noted that Danish
authorities aren’t even certain which way the money flows are supposed
to be going — is Roj-TV financing the PKK, or is it the other way
around? Communication with Turks Improving, but Expectations Differ
——————————————— ————–
5. (C) The Danes suggest that progress in the Roj-TV case has been
hampered by conceptual differences with the Turks (e.g.,
misunderstandings about what constitutes protected speech, legal
restraints on government action) and by what the Danes perceive as lack
of communication among Turkish officials. Nilas reported that her
discussions in April had been positive, and she felt that she had made
progress in explaining to the Turks what specific evidence is needed to
advance the case in Denmark. For successful prosecution in Denmark, the
state needs to show actual incitement to acts of terror, and not simply
news or editorializing, she explained. Sorensen reported that the Danes
continue to work directly and through their liaison officer in Ankara to
break through the stovepiping in Turkish law enforcement, but
communication remains a challenge.
6. (C) We see that the Danes and the Turks are sometimes talking
past each other, or at least speaking based on greatly differing
expectations. Senior Danish officials seemed caught by surprise last
month when we told them that the Turks felt let down by Denmark’s
post-Strasbourg actions; former PM Rasmussen even suggested that he and
Turkish PM Erdogan had put the issue entirely behind them. Similarly,
Prosecutor Nilas could not be optimistic about taking Roj-TV to court,
refusing to speculate on a time frame, while the Turkish embassy here
told us they were «certain» that prosecution would begin within months —
supposedly based on their discussions with Nilas and the police. «New
Angles,» Warm Welcome for U.S. Team —————————————-
7. (S) Nilas and Sorensen told us that the Danish authorities are
looking at «new angles» in the investigation and would be ready to
discuss these in more detail if and when another U.S. interagency team
visits Copenhagen, ideally sooner rather than later. Sorensen suggested
that she preferred to limit these «new angles» to intelligence channels
for the time being, but she may have been referring to an informant the
police are supposedly working with, about which we have heard some vague
reports. Sorensen suggested that the Danish government may make another
run at Roj-TV on tax issues, both in terms of possible evasion of
payments and terror finance.
8. (S) Sorensen brought up another avenue that has not yet been
explored, and that is to demonstrate that the broadcaster is
consistently one-sided in its presentation of information. Though not a
criminal offense, such a finding by the Danish Radio and TV Board could
result in revocation of the station’s license. Sorensen did not
elaborate on how this might be established or whether it has ever been
done before.
9. (S) Nilas and Sorensen were enthusiastic about a possible visit
by U.S. counterterrorism officials, indicating that they are eager to
discuss strategy and review efforts to improve coordination with Turkey.
Both recognized that new, «smoking-gun» information on Roj-TV’s PKK
connections was unlikely, but they said they would be grateful — as
always — for any U.S. intelligence that could help the prosecution.
Comment ——-
10. (S) We are convinced that the Danes would welcome an
opportunity to take action against Roj-TV and rid themselves of this
issue once and for all. We are equally certain, however, that they will
not move without some new evidence or approach that can shield them
against charges of trading principle for the former prime minister’s
career. Danish officials are committed to reinvigorated efforts to close
the station, to renewed trilateral cooperation with us and the Turks,
but in strict accordance with Danish law. Rasmussen and his former
government maintain that President Obama personally indicated
understanding for this position at Strasbourg, acknowledging the high
political costs of an abrupt, unjustified reversal. We recommend that we
— beginning with the upcoming visit of the S/CT-led delegation to
Copenhagen — engage the Danes early to review possible new lines of
approach and encourage them to think creatively about ways to disrupt or
close the station, should criminal prosecution prove unachievable in
the short term.
MCCULLEY
Τμήμα ειδήσεων defencenet.gr
Αποστροφή προκαλεί η αποκάλυψη ότι η Αμερική πίεσε τη Δανία
να «φιμώσει» την αγωνιώδη φωνή του κουρδικού λαού, ο οποίος αγωνίζεται
για την επιβίωσή του, προκειμένου να ικανοποιήσει την πάντα πρόθυμη να
υπακούσει τις σκοτεινές εντολές της Τουρκία.
Ειδικότερα, το 2009, η Δανία φέρεται να συμφώνησε να ξεκινήσει
νομική δράση για το κλείσιμο του Roj TV, του κουρδικού καναλιού που
εξέπεμπε από την Κοπεγχάγη, προκειμένου να κατευνάσει την Τουρκία.Σε
αντάλλαγμα, η Άγκυρα συμφώνησε να στηρίξει τον Rasmussen ως επικεφαλής
του ΝΑΤΟ.
Οι μυστικές αυτές συμφωνίες αποκαλύπτονται στα απόρρητα
τηλεγραφήματα των αμερικανικών πρεσβειών στην Κοπεγχάγη και την Άγκυρα
που διέρρευσαν μέσω της Wikileaks.Οι Αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες φέρεται να
έχουν συνεχή επικοινωνία με τις δύο πλευρές, πιέζοντας μάλιστα τη Δανία
να επιταχύνει τις διαδικασίες.
Στις εγκλίσεις τους, η Δανία διαμαρτύρονταν επανειλημμένα ότι η
Τουρκία δεν της παρέχει το απαραίτητο υλικό για να συνεχίσει τη νομική
διαδικασία και επέρριπτε την ευθύνη στους Τούρκους που δεν κατανοούν
πλήρως το νομικό σύστημα της Δανίας.
Ωστόσο, όλα έγιναν όπως συμφωνήθηκαν. Ο Ράσμουσεν εξελέγη γγ του
ΝΑΤΟ το 2009 με τη σύμφωνη γνώμη της Τουρκίας και το 2013 το κουρδικό
κανάλι έχασε οριστικά την άδεια εκπομπής, με την κατηγορία της προώθησης
της τρομοκρατίας.
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O’Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary. Turkey’s March 9 response to a long-standing
Danish request for concrete, «actionable» information on the
link between PKK and ROJ-TV was inadequate, Danish Ambassador
Vahr complained to us March 11. Turkey has not yet responded
to Denmark’s December proposal of formal bilateral
counterterrorism (CT) «action plan.» Vahr wonders whether
Ankara’s slowness in responding to Danish requests could be
intentional, to keep Denmark as a convenient whipping boy,
and fears closure of the current window of opportunity to
engage high-level Danish law enforcement officials. We agree
that another roundtable bringing Turkish and Danish legal
experts together to examine actual cases could help bridge
the communication gap. End summary.
ROJ-TV: The Thorn in the Side
—————————–
2. (C) Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr described to us March 11
recent Danish counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Turkey,
including Danish efforts to address the ROJ-TV issue. Turkey
asserts ROJ-TV is affiliated with and supports the PKK (KGK),
but it has not been able to provide Danish authorities with
concrete evidence of the tie between the two that would hold
up in a court of law, Vahr stated. Denmark’s inability to
find legal mechanisms to shut-down Kurdish-language
broadcasts from Denmark by ROJ-TV remains the major issue in
the bilateral relationship and the one which occupies more of
his time than any other, Vahr stated.
3. (C) Six months after Denmark’s formal request for more
concrete information to support Turkey’s allegations that
ROJ-TV is linked to the PKK (and over 10 months after its
initial informal request), Turkey’s Ministry of Justice on
March 9 finally provided an 11-page document purporting to
document the connection. Clearly frustrated, Vahr complained
the Turks response was still inadequate; the information
provided would not hold up in a court of law. Despite
several sessions between Turkish and Danish experts, Turkey
still does not seem to «get it.» Turkey continues to focus
primarily on ROJ-TV messages, whereas Denmark had explained
it needs to be able to demonstrate that ROJ-TV is either
laundering money that ends up at foundations clearly
affiliated with the PKK or that it has an institutional link
with the terrorist group. Vahr hoped for an opportunity for
Turkish and European legal experts to go over actual cases,
as suggested at the June 2008 roundtable for Turkish and
European prosecutors (Ref a).
4. (S) Vahr reviewed Danish efforts to demonstrate its
good-faith to strengthen bilateral CT cooperation. These
included Danish assistance in investigating a 2006 bombing on
Turkey’s southern coast with links to Denmark; provision of
passenger name lists for Copenhagen-Erbil flights involving
Kurdish cash couriers; September 2007 VIP security detail
training of Turkish National Police; an April 2008 visit to
Turkey by Danish State Prosecutors Office and Copenhagen
police officials directly involved with the ROJ-TV case;
January 2009 assistance to Turkey’s new witness protection
system; and ongoing cooperation on al Qaeda plots in Denmark
with links to Turkey. Noting that Turkey is in the midst of
restructuring its CT mechanisms, Vahr said he had recently
offered Interior Minister Atalay to share Denmark’s
experience establishing a counterterrorism analysis center
two years ago. The Minister was very interested, Vahr
reported.
5. (C) Denmark had also become more forthcoming on formal CT
cooperation, Amb. Vahr stated. When Turkey first proposed a
bilateral CT agreement in December 2007, during inaugural CT
consultations, Denmark was reluctant to sign a «stand alone»
agreement, proposing an MOU instead (Ref b). In December
2008, however, Denmark presented a draft bilateral CT «Action
Plan.» MFA Undersecretary Tezcan would be the likely
negotiator on the Turkish side, Vahr opined. To Vahr’s
frustration, however, Ankara has not yet responded to the
Danish proposal.
Political Games?
—————-
6. (C) Vahr speculated aloud whether Turkey’s slowness in
responding to Denmark’s requests, and the thinness of the
material provided, might be part of a deliberate effort to
drag out the ROJ-TV matter, thus retaining Denmark as a
«whipping boy» to be produced and criticized when politically
expedient. As an example, he pointed to a critical letter
sent by PM Erdogan to Danish PM Rasmussen following the
October 2008 PKK attack on a Turkish military outpost in
which 15 soldiers were reported killed. He also wondered how
the ROJ-TV issue would affect Turkey’s attitude toward the
NATO Secretary General candidacy of Danish PM Rasmussen.
Vahr was anxious to persuade the Turks to move more quickly
and to maintain the momentum in CT relations begun with the
December 2007 CT consultations and bolstered by the April
2008 Chief Prosecutor’s visit. MFA U/S Apakan had visited
Copenhagen February 24 and of course raised ROJ-TV. Now,
Vahr stressed, the two sides had a window of opportunity,
with high-level Danish interest among law enforcement
authorities. He feared Danish interest would wane if Turkey
is not more forthcoming with concrete information. Denmark
has pressing competing priorities, including a growing
domestic gang war. He understood that Turkey had been able
to provide the UK with the information needed to close
PKK-affiliated MED-TV in London in 1999 and did not
understand why they could not do the same for ROJ-TV.
Comment
——-
7. (C) ROJ-TV continues to dominate Denmark-Turkey
relations. While we understand Danish frustration, Turkey’s
«thin» responses may be a matter of inadequate understanding
of Danish legal requirements rather than of deliberately
dragging the issue out. We agree that providing Turkish and
European prosecutors and other legal experts the opportunity
to go over actual cases could prove to be a valuable
mechanism for bridging the gaps in understanding. S/CT PDAS
Schlicher’s upcoming visit to Ankara, Copenhagen and other
European capitals could also help facilitate closer
cooperation against the PKK and other terrorist groups.
Jeffrey
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Terence McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) In recent discussions, Danish government officials and the
chief prosecutor in the case against PKK-affiliated Roj-TV underscored
their determination to address that case according to Danish law,
expressing frustration with the evidence produced so far and unwilling
to predict when the station may be taken to court. Danish pledges to
intensify efforts against Roj-TV — among the measures offered Turkey for
not blocking former PM Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO secretary
general — have given additional impetus to the investigation while also
prompting senior officials to tread carefully, to avoid the appearance
of a quid pro quo (i.e., sacrificing freedom of speech in exchange for a
high-level post). The Danes report, however, that they are pursuing
«new angles» to the case and would welcome the opportunity to discuss
them in greater detail with the anticipated U.S. counterterrorism
delegation (among these «new angles» may be information developed
through an informant and alternative approaches on broadcasting content
and tax evasion). Denmark: No Interference with Judicial Process
——————————————— -
2. (S) Shortly after the NATO Strasbourg Summit at which Rasmussen
secured his new post over Turkish objections, PM National Security
Advisor Thomas Ahrenkiel emphasized to us the importance of resolving
the Roj-TV issue through legal and intelligence channels. Ahrenkiel, who
has stayed on as NSA to the new prime minister, signaled that his
office wanted to avoid any suggestion of undue political pressure in the
matter, and encouraged us to work directly with the chief prosecutor,
Lise-Lotte Nilas. When pressed a few weeks later by visiting U.S.
Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker (reftel), Ahrenkiel acknowledged that he
had not been keeping his Turkish counterpart informed about the case,
but (reluctantly, it seemed) agreed to do so in light of growing Turkish
concerns. The PM’s office and the MFA remain wary of raising their
profile on Roj-TV, concerned about the domestic political fallout and
potential damage to the case itself. Stymied on Content, Still Looking
for PKK Links ——————————————— –
3. (C) Prosecutor Nilas and Danish Security and Intelligence
Service (PET) Legal Advisor Lykke Sorensen reviewed for us the status of
the Roj-TV investigation May 20, highlighting the case’s long history
and ongoing challenges. The initial focus, they recalled, had been to
investigate Turkish complaints based on Roj-TV’s broadcasting content.
Twice the Danish Radio and Television Board has ruled on the matter,
concluding — after reviewing television footage provided by Turkish
authorities — that Roj-TV’s programming did not incite hatred, violence
or otherwise corrupt minors, as alleged by Turkey. Rather, the Danish
board ruled, most recently in May 2007, that Roj-TV’s broadcasts
resemble those of other news organizations covering violence and
terrorist acts. Sorensen noted that, otherwise, sanctions could be
similarly applied to any news outlet that covered, for example,
terrorist bombings in Iraq or news of the latest al-Qaeda statement.
Nilas noted that the recent German court decision suspending the ban on
Roj-TV there made it that much more difficult to argue against the
station on content.
4. (S) Denmark’s criminal investigation of Roj-TV has focused,
meanwhile, on establishing institutional links between the station and
the PKK, especially on the financial side. Despite the Danish police’s
and tax authorities” own efforts, intelligence provided by the Turks and
us, interdictions of suspected couriers and stepped-up cooperation with
EU partners (Nilas mentioned the Belgians, Germans and French through
EUROJUST), no clear evidence has been found to connect the broadcaster
with the PKK. Roj-TV has learned to be very careful over the years,
evincing an open and cooperative attitude toward occasional — and
fruitless — reviews of their books. Sorensen noted that Danish
authorities aren’t even certain which way the money flows are supposed
to be going — is Roj-TV financing the PKK, or is it the other way
around? Communication with Turks Improving, but Expectations Differ
——————————————— ————–
5. (C) The Danes suggest that progress in the Roj-TV case has been
hampered by conceptual differences with the Turks (e.g.,
misunderstandings about what constitutes protected speech, legal
restraints on government action) and by what the Danes perceive as lack
of communication among Turkish officials. Nilas reported that her
discussions in April had been positive, and she felt that she had made
progress in explaining to the Turks what specific evidence is needed to
advance the case in Denmark. For successful prosecution in Denmark, the
state needs to show actual incitement to acts of terror, and not simply
news or editorializing, she explained. Sorensen reported that the Danes
continue to work directly and through their liaison officer in Ankara to
break through the stovepiping in Turkish law enforcement, but
communication remains a challenge.
6. (C) We see that the Danes and the Turks are sometimes talking
past each other, or at least speaking based on greatly differing
expectations. Senior Danish officials seemed caught by surprise last
month when we told them that the Turks felt let down by Denmark’s
post-Strasbourg actions; former PM Rasmussen even suggested that he and
Turkish PM Erdogan had put the issue entirely behind them. Similarly,
Prosecutor Nilas could not be optimistic about taking Roj-TV to court,
refusing to speculate on a time frame, while the Turkish embassy here
told us they were «certain» that prosecution would begin within months —
supposedly based on their discussions with Nilas and the police. «New
Angles,» Warm Welcome for U.S. Team —————————————-
7. (S) Nilas and Sorensen told us that the Danish authorities are
looking at «new angles» in the investigation and would be ready to
discuss these in more detail if and when another U.S. interagency team
visits Copenhagen, ideally sooner rather than later. Sorensen suggested
that she preferred to limit these «new angles» to intelligence channels
for the time being, but she may have been referring to an informant the
police are supposedly working with, about which we have heard some vague
reports. Sorensen suggested that the Danish government may make another
run at Roj-TV on tax issues, both in terms of possible evasion of
payments and terror finance.
8. (S) Sorensen brought up another avenue that has not yet been
explored, and that is to demonstrate that the broadcaster is
consistently one-sided in its presentation of information. Though not a
criminal offense, such a finding by the Danish Radio and TV Board could
result in revocation of the station’s license. Sorensen did not
elaborate on how this might be established or whether it has ever been
done before.
9. (S) Nilas and Sorensen were enthusiastic about a possible visit
by U.S. counterterrorism officials, indicating that they are eager to
discuss strategy and review efforts to improve coordination with Turkey.
Both recognized that new, «smoking-gun» information on Roj-TV’s PKK
connections was unlikely, but they said they would be grateful — as
always — for any U.S. intelligence that could help the prosecution.
Comment ——-
10. (S) We are convinced that the Danes would welcome an
opportunity to take action against Roj-TV and rid themselves of this
issue once and for all. We are equally certain, however, that they will
not move without some new evidence or approach that can shield them
against charges of trading principle for the former prime minister’s
career. Danish officials are committed to reinvigorated efforts to close
the station, to renewed trilateral cooperation with us and the Turks,
but in strict accordance with Danish law. Rasmussen and his former
government maintain that President Obama personally indicated
understanding for this position at Strasbourg, acknowledging the high
political costs of an abrupt, unjustified reversal. We recommend that we
— beginning with the upcoming visit of the S/CT-led delegation to
Copenhagen — engage the Danes early to review possible new lines of
approach and encourage them to think creatively about ways to disrupt or
close the station, should criminal prosecution prove unachievable in
the short term.
MCCULLEY
Τμήμα ειδήσεων defencenet.gr
Αποστροφή προκαλεί η αποκάλυψη ότι η Αμερική πίεσε τη Δανία
να «φιμώσει» την αγωνιώδη φωνή του κουρδικού λαού, ο οποίος αγωνίζεται
για την επιβίωσή του, προκειμένου να ικανοποιήσει την πάντα πρόθυμη να
υπακούσει τις σκοτεινές εντολές της Τουρκία.
Ειδικότερα, το 2009, η Δανία φέρεται να συμφώνησε να ξεκινήσει
νομική δράση για το κλείσιμο του Roj TV, του κουρδικού καναλιού που
εξέπεμπε από την Κοπεγχάγη, προκειμένου να κατευνάσει την Τουρκία.Σε
αντάλλαγμα, η Άγκυρα συμφώνησε να στηρίξει τον Rasmussen ως επικεφαλής
του ΝΑΤΟ.
Οι μυστικές αυτές συμφωνίες αποκαλύπτονται στα απόρρητα
τηλεγραφήματα των αμερικανικών πρεσβειών στην Κοπεγχάγη και την Άγκυρα
που διέρρευσαν μέσω της Wikileaks.Οι Αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες φέρεται να
έχουν συνεχή επικοινωνία με τις δύο πλευρές, πιέζοντας μάλιστα τη Δανία
να επιταχύνει τις διαδικασίες.
Στις εγκλίσεις τους, η Δανία διαμαρτύρονταν επανειλημμένα ότι η
Τουρκία δεν της παρέχει το απαραίτητο υλικό για να συνεχίσει τη νομική
διαδικασία και επέρριπτε την ευθύνη στους Τούρκους που δεν κατανοούν
πλήρως το νομικό σύστημα της Δανίας.
Ωστόσο, όλα έγιναν όπως συμφωνήθηκαν. Ο Ράσμουσεν εξελέγη γγ του
ΝΑΤΟ το 2009 με τη σύμφωνη γνώμη της Τουρκίας και το 2013 το κουρδικό
κανάλι έχασε οριστικά την άδεια εκπομπής, με την κατηγορία της προώθησης
της τρομοκρατίας.
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O’Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary. Turkey’s March 9 response to a long-standing
Vahr complained to us March 11. Turkey has not yet responded
engage high-level Danish law enforcement officials. We agree
the communication gap. End summary.
2. (C) Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr described to us March 11
including Danish efforts to address the ROJ-TV issue. Turkey
up in a court of law, Vahr stated. Denmark’s inability to
his time than any other, Vahr stated.
3. (C) Six months after Denmark’s formal request for more
document the connection. Clearly frustrated, Vahr complained
provided would not hold up in a court of law. Despite
with the terrorist group. Vahr hoped for an opportunity for
European prosecutors (Ref a).
4. (S) Vahr reviewed Danish efforts to demonstrate its
good-faith to strengthen bilateral CT cooperation. These
with links to Turkey. Noting that Turkey is in the midst of
two years ago. The Minister was very interested, Vahr
reported.
5. (C) Denmark had also become more forthcoming on formal CT
cooperation, Amb. Vahr stated. When Turkey first proposed a
agreement, proposing an MOU instead (Ref b). In December
negotiator on the Turkish side, Vahr opined. To Vahr’s
Danish proposal.
6. (C) Vahr speculated aloud whether Turkey’s slowness in
expedient. As an example, he pointed to a critical letter
which 15 soldiers were reported killed. He also wondered how
NATO Secretary General candidacy of Danish PM Rasmussen.
2008 Chief Prosecutor’s visit. MFA U/S Apakan had visited
Copenhagen February 24 and of course raised ROJ-TV. Now,
authorities. He feared Danish interest would wane if Turkey
is not more forthcoming with concrete information. Denmark
domestic gang war. He understood that Turkey had been able
understand why they could not do the same for ROJ-TV.
7. (C) ROJ-TV continues to dominate Denmark-Turkey
relations. While we understand Danish frustration, Turkey’s
dragging the issue out. We agree that providing Turkish and
mechanism for bridging the gaps in understanding. S/CT PDAS
cooperation against the PKK and other terrorist groups.
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Terence McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) In recent discussions, Danish government officials and the
chief prosecutor in the case against PKK-affiliated Roj-TV underscored
their determination to address that case according to Danish law,
expressing frustration with the evidence produced so far and unwilling
to predict when the station may be taken to court. Danish pledges to
intensify efforts against Roj-TV — among the measures offered Turkey for
not blocking former PM Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO secretary
general — have given additional impetus to the investigation while also
prompting senior officials to tread carefully, to avoid the appearance
of a quid pro quo (i.e., sacrificing freedom of speech in exchange for a
high-level post). The Danes report, however, that they are pursuing
«new angles» to the case and would welcome the opportunity to discuss
them in greater detail with the anticipated U.S. counterterrorism
delegation (among these «new angles» may be information developed
through an informant and alternative approaches on broadcasting content
and tax evasion). Denmark: No Interference with Judicial Process
——————————————— -
2. (S) Shortly after the NATO Strasbourg Summit at which Rasmussen
secured his new post over Turkish objections, PM National Security
Advisor Thomas Ahrenkiel emphasized to us the importance of resolving
the Roj-TV issue through legal and intelligence channels. Ahrenkiel, who
has stayed on as NSA to the new prime minister, signaled that his
office wanted to avoid any suggestion of undue political pressure in the
matter, and encouraged us to work directly with the chief prosecutor,
Lise-Lotte Nilas. When pressed a few weeks later by visiting U.S.
Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker (reftel), Ahrenkiel acknowledged that he
had not been keeping his Turkish counterpart informed about the case,
but (reluctantly, it seemed) agreed to do so in light of growing Turkish
concerns. The PM’s office and the MFA remain wary of raising their
profile on Roj-TV, concerned about the domestic political fallout and
potential damage to the case itself. Stymied on Content, Still Looking
for PKK Links ——————————————— –
3. (C) Prosecutor Nilas and Danish Security and Intelligence
Service (PET) Legal Advisor Lykke Sorensen reviewed for us the status of
the Roj-TV investigation May 20, highlighting the case’s long history
and ongoing challenges. The initial focus, they recalled, had been to
investigate Turkish complaints based on Roj-TV’s broadcasting content.
Twice the Danish Radio and Television Board has ruled on the matter,
concluding — after reviewing television footage provided by Turkish
authorities — that Roj-TV’s programming did not incite hatred, violence
or otherwise corrupt minors, as alleged by Turkey. Rather, the Danish
board ruled, most recently in May 2007, that Roj-TV’s broadcasts
resemble those of other news organizations covering violence and
terrorist acts. Sorensen noted that, otherwise, sanctions could be
similarly applied to any news outlet that covered, for example,
terrorist bombings in Iraq or news of the latest al-Qaeda statement.
Nilas noted that the recent German court decision suspending the ban on
Roj-TV there made it that much more difficult to argue against the
station on content.
4. (S) Denmark’s criminal investigation of Roj-TV has focused,
meanwhile, on establishing institutional links between the station and
the PKK, especially on the financial side. Despite the Danish police’s
and tax authorities” own efforts, intelligence provided by the Turks and
us, interdictions of suspected couriers and stepped-up cooperation with
EU partners (Nilas mentioned the Belgians, Germans and French through
EUROJUST), no clear evidence has been found to connect the broadcaster
with the PKK. Roj-TV has learned to be very careful over the years,
evincing an open and cooperative attitude toward occasional — and
fruitless — reviews of their books. Sorensen noted that Danish
authorities aren’t even certain which way the money flows are supposed
to be going — is Roj-TV financing the PKK, or is it the other way
around? Communication with Turks Improving, but Expectations Differ
——————————————— ————–
5. (C) The Danes suggest that progress in the Roj-TV case has been
hampered by conceptual differences with the Turks (e.g.,
misunderstandings about what constitutes protected speech, legal
restraints on government action) and by what the Danes perceive as lack
of communication among Turkish officials. Nilas reported that her
discussions in April had been positive, and she felt that she had made
progress in explaining to the Turks what specific evidence is needed to
advance the case in Denmark. For successful prosecution in Denmark, the
state needs to show actual incitement to acts of terror, and not simply
news or editorializing, she explained. Sorensen reported that the Danes
continue to work directly and through their liaison officer in Ankara to
break through the stovepiping in Turkish law enforcement, but
communication remains a challenge.
6. (C) We see that the Danes and the Turks are sometimes talking
past each other, or at least speaking based on greatly differing
expectations. Senior Danish officials seemed caught by surprise last
month when we told them that the Turks felt let down by Denmark’s
post-Strasbourg actions; former PM Rasmussen even suggested that he and
Turkish PM Erdogan had put the issue entirely behind them. Similarly,
Prosecutor Nilas could not be optimistic about taking Roj-TV to court,
refusing to speculate on a time frame, while the Turkish embassy here
told us they were «certain» that prosecution would begin within months —
supposedly based on their discussions with Nilas and the police. «New
Angles,» Warm Welcome for U.S. Team —————————————-
7. (S) Nilas and Sorensen told us that the Danish authorities are
looking at «new angles» in the investigation and would be ready to
discuss these in more detail if and when another U.S. interagency team
visits Copenhagen, ideally sooner rather than later. Sorensen suggested
that she preferred to limit these «new angles» to intelligence channels
for the time being, but she may have been referring to an informant the
police are supposedly working with, about which we have heard some vague
reports. Sorensen suggested that the Danish government may make another
run at Roj-TV on tax issues, both in terms of possible evasion of
payments and terror finance.
8. (S) Sorensen brought up another avenue that has not yet been
explored, and that is to demonstrate that the broadcaster is
consistently one-sided in its presentation of information. Though not a
criminal offense, such a finding by the Danish Radio and TV Board could
result in revocation of the station’s license. Sorensen did not
elaborate on how this might be established or whether it has ever been
done before.
9. (S) Nilas and Sorensen were enthusiastic about a possible visit
by U.S. counterterrorism officials, indicating that they are eager to
discuss strategy and review efforts to improve coordination with Turkey.
Both recognized that new, «smoking-gun» information on Roj-TV’s PKK
connections was unlikely, but they said they would be grateful — as
always — for any U.S. intelligence that could help the prosecution.
Comment ——-
10. (S) We are convinced that the Danes would welcome an
opportunity to take action against Roj-TV and rid themselves of this
issue once and for all. We are equally certain, however, that they will
not move without some new evidence or approach that can shield them
against charges of trading principle for the former prime minister’s
career. Danish officials are committed to reinvigorated efforts to close
the station, to renewed trilateral cooperation with us and the Turks,
but in strict accordance with Danish law. Rasmussen and his former
government maintain that President Obama personally indicated
understanding for this position at Strasbourg, acknowledging the high
political costs of an abrupt, unjustified reversal. We recommend that we
— beginning with the upcoming visit of the S/CT-led delegation to
Copenhagen — engage the Danes early to review possible new lines of
approach and encourage them to think creatively about ways to disrupt or
close the station, should criminal prosecution prove unachievable in
the short term.
Λένε πως η ζωή μιμείται την τέχνη και στην προκειμένη περίπτωση μιμήθηκε μία τέχνη την οποία δεν θα θέλαμε να... μιμηθεί και συγκεκριμένα τις δυστοπικές ταινίες.
